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My reference to “Form and Figure” in the title of  this paper refers to a
continuity I wish to explore between the kind of  ontological
transformation proposed by metaphor and the productive power of
human work. The correlation I wish to draw can be expressed as that
of  the poetics of  the word to the poetics of  work. In a poetics of  the word,
meaning is constituted at two levels: the literal and metaphorical. I
relate the literal level of  meaning to the productive, or formative, capacity
of  work that responds to necessity and survival, and the metaphorical
level of  meaning to the figurative power of  work that I shall argue gestures
beyond necessity to open new possibilities of  being-in-the-world.1 By
this analysis, I intend to appreciate a greater capacity in work that not
only sustains life but in fact has a kind of  responsibility towards being-
itself, or what might be described as work’s “metaphysical calling.”2 To
be sure, Ricoeur does not offer a systematic exposition of  human work
as he does for the metaphor, and so my correlation of  the two relies on
extrapolating a philosophy of  work from his philosophical corpus.3
My argument is divided into two sections: the first will correlate the
literal and figurative levels of  metaphor to work, while the second will
explore the necessity for metaphor and work to be unified but kept
distinct.
Metaphor and Human Work
My thesis here is that the poetics of  the word and work refer
to a fundamental kind of  activity that is poiesis. Both work and metaphor
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are not only a manner of  producing but of  “bringing forth” into reality
such that our relationship to reality is refigured by them, ultimately
disclosing new interpretations of  the meaning of  being. In following
this argument, let us traverse the course Ricoeur sets out by which
literal sense gives rise to metaphorical meaning.
With the word, this literal level is the sense of  a word that lies
in potential, only to be activated in speech or in writing. It refers to
“any lexical value whatsoever.”4 There exists a range of  connotations
ready to be employed according to the “arrow of  meaning” that directs
interlocution and written discourse. The literal level of  discourse reflects
the “immediate” sense in which communication is public. Nonetheless,
Ricoeur cautions that we should not see the literal as the “proper”
mode of  language since this suggests anything non-literal would be a
deviation of  meaning. Such a reduction hinders us from seeing language
as mediating beyond the literal to something more, something entirely
new.5 Hence, the immediate literal can be opposed to the mediating
figurative. I shall turn to this figurative dimension in a moment, but let
us first compare literal meaning to the necessity of  work.
Similar to language, the literal level of  work is that which is
most obvious and therefore that which is most often identified as work
itself: one works in order to live. Nothing is more literal than so-called
brute existence where in “the sweat of  thy face shalt thou eat bread”
[Genesis 3:19]. For Marx, the literal level is what constitutes human
practice itself, for it is the inalienable capacity to work by which one
produces, or makes, oneself.6 As we shall see, nonetheless, there is a
danger to this conflation of  life and work that Ricoeur refers to as “the
triumph of  work in a void.” For now we should note that the literal
level of  work occurs as a formative function where production creates
or forms things by which human beings then realize themselves. This
is Marx’s notion of  objectification on which Ricoeur comments: “Only
when I do something is there a work, a deed, something public and
common to others, such that I realize or actualize myself. Only then do
I really come to exist.”7 Absent from Marx’s philosophy, however, is
any definite direction of this self-realization. He ambiguously describes
the human end in Das Capital as freedom that has no content.8 The
problem in Marx is that the process of  self-realization, which in turn
becomes self-legislating, cannot remain merely a form of  neutral practice
dedicated to human production. Human practice inevitably moves
beyond neutral and necessary production and commits to an ethics of
meaning and value. Here is precisely Habermas’ critique of  Marx: he
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fails to distinguish between instrumental (techne) and practical reason
(phronesis).9 Practical reason is that which is addressed to goods and
symbolic meaning, or as Habermas writes, “The practical includes all
areas of  action that have a symbolic structure, a structure that both
interprets and regulates action. The technical and the practical represent
a twofold division in the field of  human action.”10 Marx’s reduction of
human practice to instrumentality leads to the loss of  practical reason,
and this loss of  the expressly self-reflexive domain of  thinking is
radicalized in his repudiation of  theoretical reflection (sophia). For Marx
any referent of  work that lies beyond production threatens to become
ideological by placing theoria before practice. In this respect, human use
is merely recaptured within an instrumental and technical framework
of  ends.11
But does work merely fulfil an instrumental, formative
purpose? In other words, is there something else in the notion of  form
that is not simply something ready-to-hand for human use and
consumption? It would appear that Marx’s notion of  the self, although
reformulated after a suspicion arising from class struggle, is itself
unreceptive to the ongoing processes of  reality. Marx assumes that
humans merely use and produce in order to realize themselves; but
does reality, or being-itself, have any significance in this relationship?12
In pursing this question, Ricoeur’s analysis of  metaphor’s
hermeneutical nature allows us to alight upon a remarkable similarity
between word and work: namely, how meaning comes from a pre-
existing sense in order to realize a new possibility. Because the so-
called “twist”13 of  metaphorical meaning relies on the pre-existing range
of  literal meanings and connotations in order to form a non-literal
meaning, metaphor is by no means a radically free act.14 Rather, it is
indebted to the very givenness of  language (logos) itself  that, for many
thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, constitutes the intelligibility of  the
cosmos.15 It is because metaphor’s novel meaning is indebted to the
language that precedes it that its referent therefore bears on reality
itself  and is, indeed, responsible to reality. Ricoeur refers to this in
terms of  how the literal, or first level of  sense, activates the secondary
or metaphorical sense: “If  it is true that literal sense and metaphorical
sense are distinguished and articulated within an interpretation, so too
it is within an interpretation that a second-level reference, which is
properly metaphorical reference, is set free by means of  the suspension
of  the first-level reference.”16 For Ricoeur, this suspension is decisive
since the metaphorical suspends in order to preserve and refigure the
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literal. Moreover, this suspension has greater implications for the overall
aim of  interpretation. It discloses the nature of  interpretation as a
suspension of  the ego in order to realize a new self-understanding.
Interpretation is not a self-projection of  meaning but an encounter
with something entirely new, or “the disclosure of  new modes of  being.”17
This kind of  encounter, says Ricoeur, “gives to the subject a new capacity
of  knowing himself.”18 In this way, the emergence of  meaning through
the act of  interpretation is correlative to the emergence of  self-
interpretation that “gives a self to the ego.”19
We can observe a similar function in work where the formative
production of  things is not an act of  creation per se but a re-articulation
of  what is already there.20 We find in work a metaphysical depth
according to the Greek terms hyle, or matter, and morphe, or form. Human
production, or poiesis, is the means by which the already existing matter
is given form as something. Human techne, or know-how, is an addition
to the primordial phusis, or nature. In phusis, a flower blooms of  its own
accord while in techne the natural forest is seen through human eyes and
human possibilities as wood, that is, material for building.21 Indeed, a
specific kind of  wood is sought out according to this techne which is
good for a specific kind of  building: the wood for house-building is
not good for chair-building, for example. The translative feature of
work that turns matter into a thing, that is, what constitutes the “as”
structure of  hermeneutic interpretation that Heidegger brings to our
attention in Being and Time (I.v.§32.), cannot be underestimated. The
“as” structure of  interpretation liberates a thing from its literal sense
because it is in being-with things that we interpret them “as” something.
We know a table by virtue of  our comportment to it as a place to
gather, eat, pray, or have a seminar. The “as” of  a thing is not a
representation but a definite interpretation of  a thing whose meaning
is in fact present, or as Heidegger would say, a meaning that is
presencing.22 Indeed, if  the nature of  a product of  work is to endure
for human use, then this enduring, or what Ricoeur refers to as
sedimentation, is persistently open to a process of  re-interpretation
that frees it for potential meaning beyond its initial inception and thus
beyond its literal form.23
It is precisely at this moment when the literal form of  a thing
gestures beyond itself  to something greater, that we can find a
fundamental similarity shared by work and metaphorical meaning. Here,
I come to a fuller expression of  my distinction between form and
figure. I suggest that work has two functions: a primary formative function;
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and a secondary figurative function, or what constitutes the ontological
event by which “we experience the metamorphosis of…reality.”24 Like
the metaphor, the secondary, figurative meaning of  work cannot be
understood until the primary, formative meaning is engaged. “It is by
living in the first meaning,” writes Ricoeur, “that I am led by it beyond
itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and by the literal meaning.”25
With work, this means that the basic needs for survival and metabolism
are fulfilled before an interpretation of  greater ontological significance
can be engaged. This seems a point of  common sense to a large degree,
but it maintains at the same time a crucial link backwards where the
figurative meaning cannot forsake or leave behind the literal. Indeed,
one can say that the figurative does not destroy or make obsolete the
literal form. Rather, it sustains the literal by virtue of  a figurative meaning
free of the limitations of  necessity. In this respect, necessity is meaningful
only because there is something greater than brute existence that would
redeem necessity according to its “dependence on the spirit glimpsed
in its teleology” and “on the sacred glimpsed in its eschatology.”26
Even in something like insurance, there is the relation between
the metaphoric gesturing of  the underwriter whose signature signifies
approval of  a risk. Whatever business or person is insured is also
affirmed within a social nexus of  risk and negligence, security and
financial dissolvability. An insured entity is not only affirmed in the
underwriting process, but so is a general comportment to reality itself.
Hence, the discourse and thinking of  the insurance industry is adopted
into everyday life, a life that is above all characterized by the uncertainty
that insurance would seek to remove. Cannot one say that life is
translated into the discourse of  insurance (e.g., indemnity, premium,
negligence) by the gesturing of  the underwriter’s pen? Nothing appears
to escape the gesture of  the human hand through which thoughts and
actions become embodied…for better or worse.27
I suggest that because the uniquely human engagement with
things is never only necessary that the human relation to the necessary
is itself  that which can be refigured. That is to say, the necessary is not
left behind but placed within a larger ontological milieu in which it is
connected to the philosophical and theological hope for the potential
of  humankind. In this sense, we can read back onto work, at the level
of  necessity, a kind of  potency that instils and elevates work itself. If
work is often seen as the use of  hands to make and alter, then it is this
use of  the hands which is essentially a gesture to something greater than
the realm of  necessity. Indeed, as Heidegger notes: “Only a being who
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can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can be handy in achieving
works of  handicraft.”28 The gesture embodies, according to Ernst
Cassirer, “a constructive process” of  interpretation that bears meaning
within a “structural whole.”29 Similarly, Ricoeur explicitly mediates the
extension of  simple human gestures to an ontological depth that bears
on an interpretation of  reality. He writes,
The first meaning I read in my body, insofar as the body
is a mediation of  appearance, is not that it is finite, but
precisely that it is open onto. . . . The body opens me onto
the world even when it isolates me in suffering. . . . It
opens me to others insofar as it expresses, that is to say,
displays the interior upon the exterior and becomes a sign
for others, decipherable and offered to the reciprocity of
consciousness.30
The implications, on the one hand, of  what lies in work in the act of
gesturing, and on the other hand, of  the ontological significance of
this gesturing, suggests something quite radical. Work should not be
defined by the criteria of  efficiency and necessity alone. Indeed, as
Marcuse, Heidegger, and Tillich have argued, efficiency is not an end
in itself  but is always efficient for something.31 Alasdair MacIntyre states
this well when arguing that efficiency and utility are not neutral values
but by virtue of  purporting to be “value-free” impose a specific
discourse of  meaning, and therefore, inevitably become involved in
moral decisions that turn whatever neutral status its authority had into
an exercise of  power.32
A reflection on how work can be actualized beyond the values
of  efficiency and utility obviously lies outside this paper’s remit, but we
can note that such a path would attempt to think work within “the joy
of labor” and the natural calling to our talents and inclinations as a
vocation. In lieu of  such a rehabilitative project, I wish to bring to
mind a caution that needs to be maintained in any reconstruction of  a
philosophy of  work: namely, that the celebration of  work can easily
descend into a reduction of  all things into work.
Ricoeur rightly notes that the identification of  work with all
areas of  human activity tends “toward the very indeterminate notion
of  a militant and non-contemplative form of  human existence,” or
work that “triumphs in a void.”33 Heidegger, similarly, refers to
technology according to which things are “unnaturally” set forth at
one’s disposal in order to secure an aim.34 My hesitancy to identify
FORM AND FIGURE
63
work with human existence resists the reduction of  life to necessity
and toil; and moreover, it repudiates the idea that any hope for humanity
lies simply in the cessation of  such necessities. It was Count Zinzendorf
who once expressed so horribly this reduction when he said, “One
does not only work in order to live, but one lives for the sake of  one’s
work, and if  there is no more work to do one suffers or goes to sleep.”35
Work and the Word
In what way can this reduction of  all things into work be
prevented? I suggest it lies in seeing that human work is not reflective
in and of  itself. For Plato and Aristotle, techne is not a self-reflexive
form of  knowledge since it aims at an end, such as house-building, but
not the contemplation on the use of  such things.36 Work therefore
requires a constant re-invocation of  human reflection.
This limitation refers to Ricoeur’s distinction between poiesis
as art, or rendering, and poiesis as work, or making.37 “Rendering” refers
to the artistic act of  surrendering to the very vision that bodies forth in
poetry, painting, and so on. It has no commitment to necessity and
practical use, and this occurs to the extent that what is involved in the
creative act is not determined by material necessity and the intention to
form a practical-structural version of  the world: “Tell a creator, say
Van Gogh or Cézanne, that he is fabricating a world-version. He will
not recognize himself  in this account of  what he is doing . . . . The
painter – at least this kind of painter – understands himself as the
servant – if  not the slave – of  that which has to be said, depicted,
exemplified, expressed.”38 “Making,” on the other hand, refers to the
capacity to fabricate according to what has been given within a structural
whole of  production without requiring a reflection on the nature and
meaning of  the production itself. It is driven by a set of  techniques
whose aim is production for human use and not a reflection on the
nature and significance of  use. It is in this respect that for techne necessity
therefore appears as the most evident and meaningful principle in
making. What should also be noted in terms of  this kind of  making is
that while work embodies a world through its fabrication, this world is
also that which is coming to pass into something else through and in
human use. This vitality of  work is never one that sets itself  apart from
human existence but seems to be synonymous with it. Work, as
Heidegger would say, disappears in our actual engagement in it because
all effort and attention is directed at “the in order to” of  a project of
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work.39 It is reflection, on the other hand, whose meditation seeks to
put such transparencies under its gaze. In the end, work requires
reflection in order to prevent it from becoming closed in upon itself.
But at the same time, work not only requires reflection but provokes it
and therefore becomes pervaded by it. There is, according to Ricoeur,
“a power to the spoken word which traverses and penetrates everything
human, including the machine, the utensil, and the hand.”40
One can see, for example, that the nature of  work is to open
the world to inter-communication and discourse: by the interaction of
different communities linked by the trade of  commodities and ideas,
by the transmission of  techniques from one generation to the next,
and by the inheritance of  knowledge in artifacts embodying ritual and
sanctity. This ability to transmit itself  refers to a feature of  work that is
already metaphorical and is therefore irreducible to necessity alone: it
exists as one thing and yet bears the meanings and intentions of  another.
For example: in the building of  a temple, as Heidegger observes, space
is made on the earth for the temenos, or sacred space surrounding the
temple.41 And conversely, the sacred space endures by virtue of  the
temple that gathers it. But its space is not only that of  sanctity that
invokes, celebrates, and allows for propitiation. It is also, by virtue of
its being demarcated against the space that is not the temenos, a place to
be questioned, either within the immediate community that erected it
or by scholars arriving centuries later and attempting to understand the
sacred in relation to the profane. The noema of  the work-act, according
to Ricoeur, remains sedimented as a trace that is re-interpreted through
historical and social time.42 In short, if  human effort moves within an
economy of  work, this economy is also one of  discourse, or the word.43
Furthermore, the public structure that work creates is not
isolated from the communal encounter with finitude. The meaning of
a particular kind of  use is never totally transparent but enacts a particular
interpretation of  existence. For example, one can distinguish between
the focus of  the act of  hammering in a particular task (as in nailing a
plank) and the enframing that has allowed and determined such an activity
(as in nailing a plank to a fence that divides property).44 The focus of
any particular task is open to a larger milieu that bears relations of
ontological significance (or enframing) and is therefore not readily
apprehensible. In the cited example, the construction and maintenance
of  a fence bears a definite interpretation of  the “socius of  the neighbor”
that “innovates a hyper-sociological mutuality between one person and
another.”45 The fence divides, encloses, and attests to the private space
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away from and elevated above the public sphere. It gives status to the
suburban developments and the gated communities of  contemporary
America over against a social discourse of  participation.46 But in the
activity of  mending the fence, none of  this is readily associated with
the simple, practical activity that requires nothing but direct focus on
how and what to nail.
Thus, we cannot forget work is inevitably linked to the
philosophical and theological hope that seeks to redeem humankind.
In the nexus of  work, one might say that the entirety of  human praxis is
connected as if  one effort, constituting a civilization that responds to a
metaphysical calling. In other words, and according to Ricoeur, theoria
is the raison d’être of  praxis.47 The response to this calling bears witness
to the meaning of  being in such a way that it allows the question of
being to emerge within a distinct and unique relation for the public. If
work is performed in the eyes of  another, we cannot forget that this
includes the gaze of  being-itself, or as Heidegger would say, the gods
who look upon human beings.48 Work as poiesis gives to humankind an
earth to dwell upon but not the completion of  the dwelling act. It
would seem that work therefore occasions the unique kind of  human
dwelling that finds its greatest activity in the stillness of  contemplation.49
Ricoeur refers to this domain of human existence as contemplation
“without resistance,” by which he means it is a domain of  human
being that cannot be reduced to pragmatic ends. It concerns “the gaze
which would make itself  present to everything in the instant, vision
without effort because it is without resistance, possession without
duration because it is without effort. To identify existence with work
amounts to excluding pure contemplation from the properly human
condition.”50 In this same spirit, Hannah Arendt remarks at the
conclusion of  her study of  work, labor, and action: “if  . . . no other
measure but the extent of  sheer activity were to be applied to the
various activities within the vita activa [that is, the life of  praxis], it might
well be that thinking as such would surpass them all.”51
The necessity of  placing the questioning, or “dubitative,”52
capacity of  the word along side the rendering power of  work does not
identify inherent shortcomings in either human reflection or action.
Rather, it is in this relationship that we catch sight of  the hermeneutical
nature of  existence in which we reflectively apprehend a possibility of
being that we subsequently attest to in terms of  the world we render in
work.  One can begin with either pole of  this dialectic—word or work—
but to omit one in pursuing the other has consequences that we perhaps
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know all too well in the vanity of  words and the one-dimensionality of
the modern work ethic. The dialectic of  the possibility of  being and the
actuality of  work hopes in some way to redeem human toil, not by
eliminating it or reducing it but by transforming it.  But this is only to
say, after Heidegger, that ontological possibility is actuality; and in this
sense, for human civilization the imperative of  work should always be
accompanied to the end by the question.
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